

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 PANAMA 5536

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, MILI, PN
SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF US SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS FOR FY 1979

REF: STATE 133136

1. OUR SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IS INEXTRICABLY INTERWOVEN WITH OUR EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH A NEW TREATY RELATIONSHIP, AND THUS WITH OUR WHOLE POLICY TOWARD PANAMA. WE HAVE A POLICY, ELABORATED IN THE TACK-KISSINGER AGREEMENT OF 1974 WHEREBY PANAMA WOULD, DURING THE LIFE OF THE NEW TREATY, PARTICIPATE INCREASINGLY WITH THE US IN THE DEFENSE OF THE CANAL. THIS POLICY MAKES OUR MILITARY ASSISTANCE OF PANAMA A VERY SPECIAL CASE. ITS AIM IS TO CREATE AN EFFICIENT MILITARY FORCE IN A COUNTRY WHICH HERETOFORE HAS VIRTUALLY NOT HAD ARMED FORCES AT ALL. FORCE DEVELOPMENT WILL ENABLE PANAMA TO COOPERATE EFFECTIVELY IN THE PROTECTION OF A US NATIONAL SECURITY INTEREST IN THE PANAMA CANAL.

2. FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE EXERCISE GREAT CARE IN GUIDING PANAMANIAN MILITARY DEVELOPMENT-- TO THE EXTENT THAT WE CAN EXERCISE GUIDANCE. FIRST, WE
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MUST MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO SEE THAT PANAMA IS PREPARING FOR DEFENSE AGAINST THE MOST LIKELY THREATS--NOT THE THREATS OF THE PAST. SECOND, WE SHOULD SEEK TO AVOID, TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, THE APPEARANCE THAT THE US IS ARMING THE NATIONAL GUARD AGAINST THE PANAMANIAN POPULACE. THIRD, WE SHOULD AVOID PROVIDING PANAMA WITH HARDWARE WHICH EITHER IT CANNOT MAINTAIN OR IS MARGINAL

FROM A MILITARY STANDPOINT. FOURTH, WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE PANAMA TO AVOID UNNECESSARY MILITARY EXPENDITURES; IT WILL NEED ALL THE MONEY IT CAN GET FOR ITS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. FIFTH, WE SHOULD AVOID THE CREATION OF REGIONAL MILITARY IMBALANCE, ESPECIALLY WITH COSTA RICA. SIXTH, WE SHOULD AVOID POLICIES THAT ENCOURAGE PANAMA TO SEEK SOURCES OF SUPPLY OTHER THAN THE US. AND, FINALLY, WE SHOULD NOT EXPECT TOO MUCH; THE NATIONAL GUARD IS ESSENTIALLY A POLICE FORCE. THE AMOUNT OF TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT THAT WE COULD REASONABLY PROVIDE IN THE NEXT FEW YEARS WOULD BE INSUFFICIENT TO TURN IT INTO A SERIOUS FIGHTING FORCE.

3. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE NATIONAL GUARD AND THE US ARMED SERVICES HAVE BEEN COOL IN RECENT YEARS. A GENEROUS AND WELL THOUGHT OUT (BUT NOT OVERLY PATERNALISTIC) PROGRAM OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE IS OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE IN CREATING THE HARMONIOUS RELATIONSHIP US FORCES WILL NEED DURING THE PERIOD OF OUR PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR CANAL DEFENSE.

4. THE FOLLOWING REMARKS ARE KEYED TO THE QUESTIONS IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF REFTEL:

A. THE PANAMANIAN GOVERNMENT SEES NO IMMEDIATE EXTERNAL THREAT TO ITSELF. IT DOES, HOWEVER, BELIEVE THAT THE

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PANAMA CANAL IS VULNERABLE TO A VARIETY OF THREATS-- PRIMARILY SABOTAGE OR GUERRILLA ATTACK, BUT CONCEIVABLY ARMED ATTACK BY A FOREIGN POWER. IT BELIEVES THE EXISTENCE OF US MILITARY INSTALLATIONS ON THE ISTHMUS INCREASES THE THREAT TO THE CANAL. IT HAS THUS SOUGHT TO NEGOTIATE A TREATY WITH THE US WHICH WOULD LEAD TO THE GRADUAL REDUCTION OF OUR MILITARY PRESENCE; AND IT PLANS TO INCREASE THE NATIONAL GUARD'S CAPABILITY TO MEET THE REDUCED THREAT ONCE WE ARE GONE. THE GUARD HAS NOT DEVISED A SPECIFIC STRATEGY FOR MEETING THAT THREAT, THOUGH THEIR RECENTLY DEVELOPED FIVE-YEAR PLAN (PANAMA 5343) WOULD INDICATE THAT IT HAS DEVELOPED SOME PRELIMINARY PRIORITIES. WE BELIEVE THAT THESE PLANS ARE FAR FROM FIRM AND HAVE NOT BEEN FULLY THOUGHT OUT. THE EMBASSY AGREES WITH THE GOP THAT THE THREAT TO THE CANAL WILL DIMINISH ONCE A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE TREATY HAS GONE INTO EFFECT. THE PRINCIPAL CURRENT THREAT TO THE CANAL-- SABOTAGE BY PANAMANIAN OR OTHER RESIDENTS OF THE ISTHMUS-- WILL DIMINISH SHARPLY ONCE THE UNCERTAINTY AND TENSION ARISING FROM THE PRESENT TREATY ARRANGEMENT DISAPPEARS. IN OUR JUDGMENT THE PANAMANIAN GOVERNMENT SHOULD HAVE A STRONG INTERNAL SECURITY CAPACITY AND A SMALL, MOBILE

LIGHT INFANTRY FORCE WITH GOOD LOGISTICAL/MAINTENANCE
SUPPORT. IS SHOULD ALSO HAVE A NAVY (COAST GUARD)
CAPABLE OF CONTROLLING SMUGGLING AND SMALL-PARTY LANDINGS
OF SABOTEURS AND AN AIR FORCE TO PROVIDE TROOP TRANSPORT
SERVICE TO THE GUARDIA AND CIVIC ACTION SERVICES TO THE
MANY ISOLATED AREAS IN PANAMA. IN CASE OF A LARGER
MILITARY THREAT, THE GUARD SHOULD BE CAPABLE OF ASSISTING
US FORCES IN DEFENSE OF THE CANAL.

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B. IN TIME OF HOSTILITIES ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD, THE
CANAL COULD BECOME THE OBJECT OF ATTACK OR SABOTAGE.
THUS, THERE IS A MILITARY JUSTIFICATION FOR SECURITY
ASSISTANCE TO PANAMA. POLITICALLY, THERE IS A STRONG
JUSTIFICATION FOR PROVIDING SUCH ASSISTANCE AT INCREASED
LEVELS, SINCE THE TREATY SETTLEMENT WILL INCLUDE PANAM-
ANIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE PROTECTION AND DEFENSE OF
THE CANAL. UNDER THE NEW TREATY WE WILL CERTAINLY WANT
THE BEST POSSIBLE WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE NATIONAL
GUARD. WE WILL ALSO WANT IT TO BE EQUIPPED, ORGANIZED
AND DOCTRINALLY ORIENTED ALONG US LINES. WE SEE NO
SIGNIFICANT LIKELIHOOD OF A THREAT TO PANAMA FROM A NEIGH-
BORING COUNTRY--PARTICULARLY SINCE THE US WILL HAVE A
PRIMARY DEFENSE ROLE HERE FOR A GOOD MANY YEARS TO COME.

C. AS NOTED IN SUBPARAGRAPH "A" ABOVE, THE PANAMANIAN
GOVERNMENT HAS NOT DEVISED A WELL THOUGHT OUT DEFENSE
STRATEGY. AS A NEW TREATY ARRANGEMENT EMERGES, THE
MILGROUP WILL BE INCREASINGLY INVOLVED IN SEEKING TO HELP

SHARPEN THE GOP'S FOCUS ON THIS. THE PANAMANIAN MILITARY IS TRYING TO CAPITALIZE ON THE US DESIRE FOR A NEW TREATY AND THEIR TACTICAL FORCES DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY IS DESIGNED TO CONFIDENTIAL

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OBTAIN A LARGE ARMS PACKAGE FOR TREATY-RELATED COMBINED DEFENSE, AS WELL AS NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT. THEIR PLAN IS REFERRED TO AS THE "FIVE YEAR PLAM" THE GUARD HAS EXPANDED THE FORMER 10 YEAR FORCE DEVELOPMENT PLAN BY INCLUDING UNREALISTIC REQUIREMENTS FOR AIRCRAFT (A-7 OR A-37) AND SHIPS THAT ARE BEYOND THEIR CAPABILITY TO EITHER MAN OR MAINTAIN. IN COMPARISON, THE WRITTEN PORTION OF THEIR GROUND FORCE DEVELOPMENT PLAN (TWO BATTALIONS) IS MORE REALISTIC AND DESIRABLE. THEIR LONG-TERM GROUND FORCE ASPIRATION OF FIVE BATTALIONS APPEARS EXCESSIVE. THE GUARD'S FIVE YEAR PLAN WAS THE SUBJECT OF A RECENT DISCUSSION BETWEEN CINCSOUTH AND THE GUARD G-3. AS A RESULT OF THIS MEETING, A WORKING GROUP, WITH REPRESENTATIVES FROM SOUTHCOM, MILGP PANAMA AND THE GUARD WILL, JOINTLY, REVIEW THE PLAN WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF FORMULATING A MORE REALISTIC AND COMPLETE DEVELOPMENT PLAN WITH SUPPORTABLE MILITARY REQUIREMENTS FOR CANAL DEFENSE. FURTHERMORE, THERE IS THE POSSIBILITY THE GUARD MAY SEEK TO OBTAIN EQUIPMENT WHICH IS PRIMARILY AIMED AT CONTROL OF THE PANAMANIAN POPULATION OR FOR REASONS OF NATIONAL PRIDE AND PRESTIGE. IT IS NOT OUR INTENTION TO COOPERATE IN THE BUILDING UP OF ARMED FORCES FOR SUCH UNDESIRABLE PURPOSES. BUT, WE WILL HAVE A HEAVY OBLIGATION TO HELP PANAMA DEVELOP ITS CAPACITY TO DEFEND THE CANAL.

D. THE PRESENT AND PROJECTED STATE OF GUARD FORCE DEVELOPMENT AND CREDIT PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH FMS ARREARAGES MAKE IT REASONABLE TO ASSUME THAT THE GUARD WILL STILL BE TRYING TO EQUIP ITS FIRST INFANTRY BATTALION IN FY79. AIR FORCE AND NAVY DEVELOPMENT WILL BE IN A SIMILAR EMBRYONIC STAGE. NO CO-PRODUCTION IS FORESEEN OR RECOMMENDED FOR PANAMA. ARMS REQUIRED FOR CONFIDENTIAL

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FY79 WOULD INCLUDE:

(1) GROUND FORCES. THE PRINCIPAL NEED WILL BE ARMS TO COMPLETE THE ACTIVATION OF THE 1ST GN INFANTRY BATTALION. THE BATTALION COMMAND SECTION AND THE HEADQUARTERS/SUPPORT COMPANY WILL PROBABLY STILL REQUIRE EQUIPMENT TO COMPLETE

BATTALION ACTIVATION, TO INCLUDE:

WEAPONS	QUANTITY	
4.2 IN MORTAR	4	
MACHINE GUN, CAL .50	4	
VEHICLES		
TRUCK, UTILITY, 1/4 TON, M151	29	
TRAILER, CARGO, M416	29	
TRUCK, CARGO, 5/4 TON M715	9	
TRAILER, CARGO, M701A1	9	
TRUCK, AMBULANCE, 5/4 TON, TACTICAL M809	4	
TRUCK, CARGO, 2-1/2TON, M35A2	20	
TRAILER, CARGO, M105A2	16	
TRAILER, WATER, M149A1	4	
TRUCK, FUEL, M49A2C	2	
TRUCK, VAN, EXPANSIBLE, 2-1/2 TON, M292A1	3	
WRECKER, 5TON, M543A2	1	

COMMUNICATIONS		
RADIO SET, AN/PRC-77	6	
RADIO SET, AN/VRC-47	4	
RADIO SET, AN/GRC-106	3	
TELEPHONE SET, TA312	23	
CABLE, TELEPHONE, DR/8	12	
REELING MACHINE, CABLE, HAND	6	
SWITCHBOARD, SB22	2	
SWITCHBOARD, SB993	3	
TELETYPE, AN/FGC-25	1	
RADIO SET, AN/VRC-49	5	
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RADIO SET, AN/VRC-44	3
RADIO SET, AN/VRC-46	7
RADIO SET, AN/GRC-160	17

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THESE ITEMS WILL PROVIDE THE COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS,
LOGISTICAL SUPPORT, MINIMUM INDIRECT FIRE SUPPORT AND
EMERGENCY MEDICAL SUPPORT FOR A LIGHT INFANTRY BATTALION.
THIS EQUIPMENT WILL BE SUPPLEMENTED BY SUFFICIENT INDIV-
IDUAL WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT TO OUTFIT THE SOLDIERS IN THE
COMPANY.

PANAMA APPARENTLY INTENDS TO USE THE MAJORITY OF THIS
BATTALION AS ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE COMBINED DEFENSE
FORCE FOR THE PANAMA CANAL. THE EQUIPMENT FOR THIS
BATTALION IS A SYSTEM THAT IS REALISTICALLY ORIENTED TO
PANAMA'S NEEDS AND IS REQUIRED FOR PANAMA TO FIELD AN
INFANTRY BATTALION.

(2) NAVY.

ITEM	QUANTITY
85 FT PATROL BOAT	1
LCM-8	2
20MM GUN, AMMO AND PARTS	1
50 CAL MACHINE GUN, AMMO AND PARTS	4

THE NAVY EQUIPMENT WILL ENABLE PANAMA TO CONTINUE THE
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COAST GUARD AND CIVIC ACTION THRUST OF ITS NAVAL DEVELOPMENT.
PANAMA IS A MAJOR TRANSSHIPMENT POINT FOR DRUGS AND CONTRA-
BAND, AND PANAMA NEEDS TO IMPROVE ITS CAPABILITY TO PATROL
ITS TERRITORIAL WATERS. TRANSPORTATION SERVICES FOR CIVIC
ACTION PROJECTS IS A MAJOR ACTIVITY OF THE NAVY, AND PANAMA
WILL CONTINUE TO EMPLOY ITS UTILITY CRAFT ON A DAILY BASIS
IN THIS ROLE.

(3) AIR FORCE. THE AMOUNT AND TYPE OF EQUIPMENT THAT
THE PANAMA AIR FORCE (FAP) MAY SEEK TO ACQUIRE IN FY79
IS BASED ON MANY AND VARIED PROBABILITIES AND UNCERT-
AINTIES. PANAMA'S FIVE YEAR PLAN IS EXCESSIVE AND
OUR ESTIMATES OF EQUIPMENT THAT THE FAP MIGHT SEEK TO
OBTAIN IN FY79 DOES NOT REFLECT THE A-7 AND A-37S IN

THIS PLAN. WE DO REFLECT PRIOR YEAR THINKING AS DOCUMENTED BY OUR INPUT TO THE MSAP AND JSOP THAT (DESPITE SLIPPAGE) PROGRAMS THE ACQUISITION OF AIRCRAFT MORE IN KEEPING WITH PANAMA'S NEEDS. THE BEST ESTIMATE TODAY IS THAT THE FAP MAY BE PERSUADED TO SEEK TWO (2) UH-1N HELICOPTERS AND ONE (1) L-188A (LOCKHEED ELECTRA). FINANCING PROBLEMS HAVE CAUSED THE FAP TO POSTPONE PLAN FOR ACQUISITION OF A C-130 AIRCRAFT, WHICH UP UNTIL RECENTLY HAD BEEN IN THE FY79 PLAN.

(4) FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENT. FMS FINANCING IS RECOMMENDED UNLESS SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS (E.G., GRANTS, SUPPORTING ASSISTANCE) SHOULD BE PROVIDED IN THE TREATY CONTEXT. PANAMA'S ECONOMIC SITUATION IS SUCH THAT THE FORECASTED MILITARY DEVELOPMENT IS UNLIKELY TO BE FEASIBLE WITHOUT SOME FORM OF FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE.

E. THE FY79 PANAMANIAN PURCHASE OF MILITARY SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT PROPOSED IN PARA 4 E WOULD HAVE NO SIGNIFICANT

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IMPACT ON PANAMA'S ECONOMY, THE GOP'S DEBT SERVICING CAPACITY, OR ITS DEVELOPMENT PLAN--ASSUMING FMS CREDIT TERMS OF, E.G., FIVE YEARS. AT AN ESTIMATED VALUE OF \$5-6 MILLION, THE PURCHASE WOULD ADD NO MORE THAN \$1 MILLION ANNUALLY TO PANAMA'S DEFENSE BURDEN--LITTLE MORE THAN 5 PERCENT OF THE ESTIMATED \$15 MILLION PANAMA IS SPENDING CURRENTLY FOR DEFENSE. THIS AMOUNT WOULD BE OF MINOR SIGNIFICANCE EVEN IN THE FACE OF THE GOP'S BURDENSOME DEBT SERVICING REQUIREMENTS, WHICH CURRENTLY TOTAL WELL OVER \$150 MILLION ANNUALLY. MOREOVER, PANAMA'S DEFENSE BURDEN WOULD REMAIN BELOW 1 PERCENT OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, COMPARED TO 2-4 PERCENT FOR MOST LDC'S AND 1-2 PERCENT FOR MOST OF CENTRAL AMERICA.

F. NO USG OR CIVILIAN CONTRACT PERSONNEL ARE FORESEEN FOR PANAMA. PANAMA DOES NOT HAVE THE RESOURCES TO EXPEND ON CONTRACT TECHNICAL SERVICES AND THE PLANNED PURCHASES SHOULD BE WITHIN THE TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES OF THE GUARD.

G. THE EQUIPMENT RECOMMENDED IN PARA 4 E IS UNSOPHISTICATED AND COMPARABLE EQUIPMENT IS READILY AVAILABLE FROM OTHER COUNTRIES. PANAMA HAS EXPRESSED A STRONG PREFERENCE FOR US EQUIPMENT. THE VERY CONCEPT OF COMBINED DEFENSE AND THE EXISTING LOGISTICAL SUPPORT BASE IN THE CANAL ZONE MAKES ACQUISITION OF COMPATIBLE US EQUIPMENT LOGICAL TO PANAMA. A US FAILURE TO MEET PANAMA'S RELATIVELY UNSOPHISTICATED DEFENSE ASPIRATIONS WOULD PROBABLY FORCE PANAMA TO SEEK OTHER SUPPLIERS AND

TO QUESTION OUR SINCERITY IN THE COMBINED DEFENSE PLEDGE.
FURTHERMORE, WE BELIEVE THE GOP WILL PERSIST IN ITS
DESIRE TO OBTAIN SOME JET AIRCRAFT. WE WILL ATTEMPT TO
PERSUADE THEM THAT THIS ACQUISITION IS NOT IN THEIR
BEST INTERESTS.

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H. THE RECOMMENDED EQUIPMENT DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE
ANY ARMS CONTROL IMPACT. COLOMBIA HAS MORE ADVANCED
EQUIPMENT; COSTA RICA DOES NOT. (BUT SEE PARA 2 ABOVE
FOR MEDIUM TERM (1980'S) CONCERN VIS-A-VIS COSTA RICA.
PANAMA'S FIVE YEAR PLAN MIGHT HAVE ARMS CONTROL IMPACT IN
TERMS OF REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS.)

I. THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN PANAMA IS ESSENTIALLY
UNCHANGED. IN SEPTEMBER 1976 THE GOVERNMENT OF PANAMA
WAS FORCED TO PUT DOWN STUDENT RIOTS, AND ITS MANNER OF
DOING SO WAS SUBJECT TO SOME CRITICISM. IN THE SPRING
OF 1977 IT REVIEWED THE NAMES OF POLITICAL EXILES AND
DECIDED TO PERMIT MORE THAN HALF TO RETURN TO PANAMA IF
THEY WISHED. WE DOUBT THAT PROVIDING EQUIPMENT AND
TRAINING IN IMPLEMENTATION OF OUR POLICY WILL HAVE MUCH
IMPACT ON HUMAN RIGHTS HERE. THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT,
IF THE PANAMANIAN GOVERNMENT SHOULD TAKE A REPRESSIVE
TURN, MILITARY EQUIPMENT PROVIDED UNDER THE PROGRAMS
MIGHT NOT BE USED AGAINST PANAMANIAN CITIZENS.

J. PANAMA DOES NOT HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO BE AN ARMS
SUPPLIER; ITS COOPERATION AS A PURCHASER IS DIRECTLY
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RELATED TO THE US CAPABILITY TO HELP PANAMA MEET ITS
MINIMUM ASPIRATIONS (SEE 4G ABOVE).

K. THE CURRENT IMET PROGRAM IS ORIENTED TOWARD PROFESSIONAL RATHER THAN EQUIPMENT-RELATED TRAINING. THIS ORIENTATION HAS BEEN PARTIALLY CAUSED BY THE CANCELLATION OF MANY TECHNICAL COURSES PREVIOUSLY OFFERED BY CANAL ZONE SCHOOLS. UNFORTUNATELY, LIMITED RESOURCES MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR PANAMA TO DEVELOP ITS OWN EQUIPMENT-RELATED COURSES. THESE SAME RESOURCE LIMITATIONS MAKE IT HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT PANAMA WILL PURCHASE EITHER EQUIPMENT-RELATED OR PROFESSIONAL TRAINING FROM THE US UNDER FMS. THE HIGH COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS TRAINING AND THE COSTS OF THE PREREQUISITE LANGUAGE TRAINING WILL PRECLUDE PANAMA FROM PURCHASING FMS TRAINING IN MOST INSTANCES. PANAMA IS AN ENTHUSIASTIC SUPPORTER OF AND SUBSCRIBER TO THE CANAL ZONE SCHOOLS AND WILL CONTINUE TO SEND STUDENTS TO THE SCHOOLS. PANAMA WILL CONTINUE TO SEND SELECTED STUDENTS TO THE US UNDER IMET FOR COURSES NOT AVAILABLE IN THE CANAL ZONE. AS THE GUARDIA NACIONAL EXPANDS THERE MAY BE SOME EXPANSION FOR STATE-SIDE IMET TRAINING FOR CRITICALLY NEEDED TRAINING, FOR EXAMPLE, COAST GUARD OCS. WHEREEVER POSSIBLE, HOWEVER, PANAMA WILL OPT FOR THE CHEAPER ZONE SCHOOLS IN ORDER TO STRETCH THE IMET DOLLAR. PANAMA CURRENTLY PAYS THE TRAVEL AND LIVING ALLOWANCES FOR STUDENTS ATTENDING IMED TRAINING.

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